The distinction between empowerment and protection rules is made to structure the discussion, but it is not a formal legal distinction. See section 5.1.
Directive has elements that aim to protect the individual. For example, even after a firm obtains an individual's consent, data protection law does not allow excessive personal data processing. And data protection law always requires firms to secure the data they process. But enforcing data protection law may not be enough to protect privacy in this area. I argue that, if society is better off when certain behavioural targeting practices do not happen, policymakers should consider banning them.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the practice of behavioural targeting and related privacy problems. Section 3 discusses the current regulatory regime to protect privacy in this area, and shows informed consent plays a central role in the regime. Section 4 analyses problems with informed consent through the lens of behavioural sciences. The section discusses information asymmetry, transaction costs, and biases that influence people's privacy decisions. Taking the behavioural economic insights into account, section 5 discusses two ways to improve privacy protection in the area of behavioural targeting: empowerment and protection of the individual. Section 6 concludes.
Behavioural Targeting and Privacy
Much of the commercial data collection on the Internet is driven by behavioural targeting, a type of electronic direct marketing. Vast amounts of information about hundreds of millions of people is collected for behavioural targeting.
In a simplified example, behavioural targeting involves three parties: an Internet user, a website publisher, and an advertising network. Advertising networks are firms that serve ads on thousands of websites, and can recognise people when they browse the web. An ad network might infer that somebody who often visits websites about tennis is a tennis enthusiast. If that person visits a news website, the ad network might display advertising for tennis rackets. When simultaneously visiting that same website, somebody who visits many websites about economics might see ads for economics books.
A commonly used technology for behavioural targeting involves cookies. A cookie is a small text file that a website publisher stores on a user's computer to recognise that device during subsequent visits. Many websites use cookies, for example to remember the contents of a virtual shopping cart (first party cookies). Ad networks can place and read cookies as well (third party cookies). As a result, an ad network can follow an
Internet user across all websites on which it serves ads. Third party tracking cookies are placed through virtually every popular website. A visit to one website often leads to receiving third party cookies from dozens of ad networks. In addition to cookies, firms use other tracking technologies for behavioural targeting, such as various kinds of super cookies, device fingerprinting and deep packet inspection. Therefore, deleting cookies is not always enough to prevent being tracked. 5 For example, somebody who fears surveillance might hesitate to look for medical information on the web, or to read about political topics. Regardless of how data are used at later stages, the mere collection of data can cause a chilling effect.
Second, people lack control over data concerning them. People do not know which information is collected, how it is used, and with whom it is shared (see section 4.1).
The feeling of lost control is a privacy problem. And large-scale personal data storage brings risks. For instance, a data breach could occur, or data could be used for unexpected purposes, such as identity fraud. Since its inception in the early 1970s, data protection law has evolved into a complicated field of law. Borrowing from Bygrave, the core of data protection law can be summarised in nine data protection principles: the principle of fair and lawful processing, the transparency principle, the principle of data subject participation and control, the purpose limitation principle, the data minimisation principle, the data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified." 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. The balancing provision allows certain data processing activities on an opt-out basis, without the data subject's prior consent. The balancing provision allows processing when it is necessary for the firm's legitimate interests, except where such interests are overridden by the data subject's interests or fundamental rights. 35 The balancing provision is the appropriate legal ground for innocuous standard business practices.
For example, a firm can generally rely on the balancing provision for postal direct marketing of its own products to current or past customers. If a firm relies on the balancing provision for direct marketing, data protection law grants the data subject the right to stop the processing, by opting out. 36 The Data Protection Directive does not say explicitly whether behavioural targeting can be based on the balancing provision. But the most convincing view is that firms cannot base personal data processing for behavioural targeting on the balancing provision, in particular when it involves tracking somebody over multiple websites. 37 The data subject's interests must generally prevail over the firm's business interests, as behavioural targeting involves collecting and processing information about personal matters such as people's browsing behaviour. The Working Party confirms that firms can almost never rely on the balancing provision to process personal data for behavioural targeting.
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If firms want to process personal data, and cannot base the processing on the balancing provision or another legal ground, they must ask the data subject for consent. 39 The Working Party says consent is generally the required legal ground for personal data processing for behavioural targeting. informed indication of wishes. 41 People can express their will in any form, but mere silence or inactivity is not an expression of will. This is also the predominant view in general contract law. 42 During the drafting of the Directive in the early 1990s, firms claimed the law should allow them to obtain 'implied' consent by offering people the chance to object, with an opt-out system. 43 Presumably firms assumed it would be easier to obtain consent through opt-out systems than through opt-in systems. But the European policymaker rejected the idea that somebody expresses her will to consent to processing, merely because she fails to object.
44
In line with the transparency principle, consent has to be specific and informed.
Consent cannot be valid if a consent request does not include a specified processing purpose and other information that is necessary to guarantee fair processing.
Furthermore, consent must be 'free'. For instance, if an employer asks an employee for consent, the consent might not be sufficiently voluntary, because of the imbalance of power. The employee might fear adverse consequences if she does not consent.
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Negative pressure would make consent invalid, but positive pressure is generally allowed. 46 In many circumstances, current data protection law probably allows firms to offer take-it-or-leave-it choices. One data protection handbook contends: In sum, behavioural targeting generally entails the processing of personal data, also if firms do not tie a name to the data they have on individuals. The law usually requires firms to obtain the data subject's informed consent for personal data processing for behavioural targeting.
Informed Consent for Tracking Technologies
European legal discussions on behavioural targeting often focus on the e-Privacy 
Informed Consent in Practice
People's choices regarding privacy can be analysed using economic theory. Acquisti, one of the leading scholars on the economics of privacy, explains: 'privacy economics deals with informational trade-offs: it tries to understand, and sometimes quantify, the 
Information Asymmetries
Information asymmetry 'means that a party in an interaction may know more about the activity that it is engaged in than does the other party.' 58 Since the 1970s economists devote much attention to markets with asymmetric information, for example where consumers have difficulties evaluating the quality of products or services. Akerlof used the market for used cars as an example. 59 Suppose sellers offer good cars and bad cars ('lemons'). Sellers know whether they have a good car or a lemon for sale, but buyers cannot detect hidden defects. A rational buyer will offer the price corresponding to the average quality of all used cars on the market. But this means that sellers of good cars are offered a price that is too low. Hence, owners of good cars will not offer their cars for sale. The result is that the average quality of used cars on the market decreases. Buyers will therefore offer lower prices, and fewer people will offer their cars for sale. The average quality of cars on the market will drop. Sellers thus do not compete on quality in a market characterised by asymmetric information about quality. Such a lemons situation can lead to products or services of low quality: a race to the bottom. 55 Acquisti A, 'Nudging Privacy. The behavioral economics of personal information' (2009) 
Transaction Costs
Data protection law aims to reduce the information asymmetry by requiring firms to disclose certain information to data subjects. The Data Protection Directive obliges firms to provide the data subject information about their identity and the processing purpose, and all other information that is necessary to guarantee fair processing.
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Website publishers can use a privacy policy to comply with data protection law's transparency requirements. These requirements also apply if a firm does not seek the data subject's consent, but relies on another legal ground for data processing. when no firm has a monopoly or a similar position), there might not be any privacyfriendly competitors. After all, in a market with information asymmetry firms will generally not compete on quality or, in this case, on privacy-friendliness. Besides, somebody who wants to visit website X, may not see website Y as a valid alternative.
As Helberger puts it, "media is speech, and when consuming media content it does matter who the speaker is."
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Privacy policies thus fail to inform people that use computers. It is even harder to inform people who use mobile devices with smaller screens. In sum, data protection law does not solve the information asymmetry problem.
Status Quo Bias
A hypothetical fully rational person would know how to deal with information asymmetry and uncertainty. For instance, she could base her decision on what happens to people's personal data on average, and she would not be optimistic about quality in a market with information asymmetry. But behavioural sciences insights suggest that people do not tend to deal with information asymmetry in a 'rational'
way. Rather, they often rely on rules of thumb, or heuristics. the present than on the future. People often choose for immediate gratification, thereby ignoring future costs. For example, myopia helps to explain why many people find it hard to save money for their retirement.
Because of myopia, people might choose immediate access to a service, also if this means they have to consent to behavioural targeting, contrary to their earlier plans.
Suppose Alice reads about behavioural targeting, and decides not to accept any more tracking cookies. That night, she wants to read an online newspaper, and wants to watch the news online. Both websites deny entrance to visitors that do not accept the tracking cookies of third parties. 97 While she was planning not to accept any more tracking cookies, Alice clicks 'yes' on both websites.
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As noted, under the Data Protection Directive consent must be 'free' to be valid. 99 But in most circumstances data protection law probably allows firms to offer take-it-orleave-it-choices. In principle, firms are allowed to offer people that consent something in return, such as a discount. This suggests that firms can make the use of a service dependent on consent to behavioural targeting. Hence, in principle current law seems to allow website publishers to install 'tracking walls', barriers that website visitors can only pass if they consent to being tracked. to access certain information online is through the broadcaster's website. 101 The
Working Party emphasises that consent should be free, but does not say that current data protection law prohibits tracking walls in all circumstances. 102 Overconfidence and optimism biases are related to myopia. People tend to underestimate the risk of accidents and diseases, and overestimate the chances of a long and healthy life or winning the lottery. The success of 'buy now, pay later' deals can be partly explained by myopia and optimism bias. 103 Research suggests people also tend to underestimate the risks of identity fraud and of re-identification of anonymised data. 104 The way information is presented can also influence decisions: the framing effect. For example, many people see a link to a privacy policy as a quality seal. 41% of Europeans do not read privacy policies, because they think it is enough to check whether a website has one. 105 In a California survey the majority thought that the mere fact that a website had a privacy policy meant that their privacy was protected by law. 106 Turow at al. argue that the phrase 'privacy policy' is misleading. 107 Facebook speaks of a 'data use policy', which seems a more apt name. 108 Research suggests that privacy policies with vague language give people the impression that a service is more privacy-friendly than privacy policies that give more details. 109 Another study concludes that 'any official-looking graphic' can lead people to believe that a website is trustworthy. 110 Böhme and Köpsell find that people are more likely to consent if a pop-up looks more like an end user license agreement (EULA). The researchers varied the design of consent dialog boxes and tested the effect by analysing the clicks of more than 80.000 people. They conclude that people are conditioned to click 'agree' to a consent request if it resembles a EULA.
[U]biquitous EULAs have trained even privacy-concerned users to click on 'accept' whenever they face an interception that reminds them of a EULA. This behaviour thwarts the very intention of informed consent. So we are facing the dilemma that the long-term effect of well-meant measures goes in the opposite direction: rather than attention and choice, users exhibit ignorance. 
Behavioural Market Failures
Behavioural sciences insights can help to explain the alleged privacy paradox. People say in surveys they care about privacy, but often divulge personal data in exchange for minimal benefits. Part of this is conditioning: many people click 'yes' to any statement that is presented to them. It is only a slight exaggeration to say: people do not read privacy policies; if they were to read, they would not understand; if they understood, they would not act.
Because privacy choices are context-dependent, caution is needed when drawing conclusions about the effect of biases. One bias might influence a privacy decision in one direction, while another bias might influence the decision in another direction. 113 Still, it would be naïve to ignore behavioural sciences when making laws that rely, in part, on the decisions of people whose privacy the law aims to protect.
Biases can lead to behavioural market failures. These are 'market failures that complement the standard economic account and that stem from the human propensity to err.' 114 This chapter distinguishes empowerment and protection rules to structure the discussion, but the distinction is not a formal legal distinction. The chapter uses rules that aim for data subject control and rules that aim for empowerment roughly interchangeably. Examples of empowerment rules are default rules that give the data subject the choice to allow data processing or not, such as informed consent requirements. 117 Other empowerment rules aim to make data processing transparent for the data subject, or grant data subjects rights, for instance to access and correct their data.
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Protection rules are generally mandatory. They always apply, irrespective of whether the data subject has consented to processing. For instance, under data protection law firms must always secure the data they process. 119 Another example of data protection law's aim to protect people is the existence of independent Data Protection Authorities that oversee compliance with the rules, as required by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Individual Empowerment
How could the law improve empowerment of the individual? To reduce the information asymmetry in the area of behavioural targeting, data protection law's transparency principle should be enforced more strictly. The Working Party says privacy policies and consent requests must be phrased in a clear and comprehensible 117 See on the distinction between default and mandatory rules: Ayres I, 'Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules' (2012). 118 See article 10 and 11 (transparency) and article 12 (access and correction) of the Data Protection Directive. 119 Article 17 (and 16) of the Data Protection Directive. 120 Chapter 9 returns to the topic of rules that aim to protect the data subject.
manner. 121 The European Commission proposal for a Data Protection Regulation codifies this requirement. 122 Such a rule could discourage firms from using legalese in privacy policies, and would make it easier for DPAs to intervene when a firm uses a privacy policy or a consent request that is too vague. Given the fact that people currently would need several weeks per year to read privacy policies, such a rule would not be enough to ensure actual transparency. Still, the rule could help to lower the costs of reading privacy policies. And apart from data subjects, the press can also read privacy policies. A change in a firm's privacy policy could lead to media attention, and sometimes firms react to that. 
Consent for tracking technologies
Human attention is scarce, and too many consent requests can overwhelm people.
Therefore, the scope of article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive is too broad. Article 5(3) requires consent for storing or accessing information on a user's device. This means the provision also requires consent for some cookies that are not used to collect detailed information about individuals. But there is little reason to ask consent for innocuous practices. For instance, perhaps certain types of cookies that are used for website analytics could be exempted from the consent requirement, provided they do not threaten privacy and are not used to construct profiles of people. 'that privacy nudges can potentially be a powerful mechanism to help some people avoid unintended disclosures.' 132 Balebako et al have explored 'nudging users towards privacy on mobile devices', to help people with decisions regarding the sharing of location data. 133 There is also research on nudging people to avoid installing privacyinvasive smart phone apps. 134 Setting defaults is a classic example of nudging. The status quo bias suggests that requiring opt-in consent for tracking could nudge people towards disclosing fewer data. 135 Hence, if the goal is protecting privacy, behavioural sciences insights suggest that the law should require opt-in systems for valid consent. This implies that the existing rules regarding consent should be enforced. As noted, the European Commission proposal for a Data Protection Regulation tightens the requirements for consent. 136 The proposal also codifies the Working Party's view that a consent request may not be hidden in a privacy policy or in terms and conditions.
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Tracking walls
There is a problem when policymakers prescribe default settings to make behavioural targeting firms nudge people towards disclosing less data. Such firms may have an incentive to collect as much information as possible. As Willis notes, firms have many ways to persuade people to opt in to tracking. 138 It is hard for policymakers to make firms use behaviourally informed instruments, if firms do not want to nudge people in the same direction as the policymaker. Sunstein puts it as follows: 'if regulated institutions are strongly opposed to a default rule and have easy access to their customers, they may well be able to use a variety of strategies, including behavioral ones, to encourage people to move in the direction the institutions prefer.' 139 For instance, firms can offer take-it-or-leave-it choices, such as tracking walls on websites. Hence, even if firms offered transparency and asked prior consent for behavioural targeting, people might still feel they must consent.
Should the law do anything about take-it-or-leave-it choices regarding the enjoyment of privacy when using websites and other Internet services? Some have suggested that tracking walls and similar take-it-or-leave-it-choices should be prohibited. 140 Another option would be to ban such take-it-or-leave-it choices in certain contexts. (The next section returns to the topic of context-specific rules.)
It has also been suggested that the law should require firms to offer a tracking-free version of their services, which has to be paid for with money. 141 Such a rule would enable people to compare the prices of websites. Now the 'price' of a website is usually hidden because people do not know which information about them is captured, nor how it will be used. 142 A requirement for firms to offer a tracking-free but paid-for version of their service would be less protective of privacy than a ban on tracking walls. Myopia might lead most people to choose for the so-called free version, because they focus on the short-term loss of paying for a service, also if this means they have to consent to behavioural targeting, contrary to earlier plans.
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Furthermore, many say it is 'extortion' if they have to pay for privacy. Relying on informed consent, in combination with data protection law's other safeguards, will probably remain the appropriate approach in many circumstances.
For those cases, transparency and consent should be taken seriously. Fostering individual control over personal information alone will not suffice to protect privacy in the area of behavioural targeting. But some improvement must be possible, compared to the current situation of almost complete lack of individual control over personal information.
In conclusion, regarding the requirements for valid consent, the formal legal framework is essentially in line with behavioural sciences insights. Firms are not allowed to infer consent from mere silence -and should not be allowed to do so. But even if firms offered transparency and asked for opt-in consent for tracking, the issue of take-it-or-leave-it choices and tracking walls would remain. As long as the law allows take-it-or-leave-it choices, opt-in systems will not be effective privacy nudges.
Individual Protection
A second legal approach to improve privacy protection in the area of behavioural targeting involves protecting, rather than empowering, people. If fully complied with, the data protection principles could give reasonable privacy protection in the area of behavioural targeting, even if people agreed to consent requests.
Of course, the Data Protection Directive is only relevant if the practice of behavioural targeting is found to come within the directive's scope. This will be the case if pseudonymous data, such as the data that are used for behavioural targeting, are seen as personal data. Hence, from a normative perspective, data protection law should apply to behavioural targeting, including when firms use pseudonymous data. Apart from that, a sensible interpretation of data protection law implies that data that are used to 'single out' a person should be seen as personal data.
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While consent plays an important role in data protection law, its role is also limited.
Consent can provide a legal ground for personal data processing. However, if a firm has a legal ground for processing, the other data protection provisions still apply. data must be collected for specified purposes, and may not be used for unexpected purposes. 149 Hence, a contract between a firm and a data subject would not be enforceable if it stipulated that the firm does not have to secure the personal data, or can use the data for new purposes at will.
The data minimisation principle, if effectively enforced, is an example of a data protection principle that could protect privacy, also after people consent to behavioural targeting. The Data Protection Directive says data processing must be 'not excessive' in relation to the processing purpose, and it follows from the Directive's structure that this requirement also applies if the processing is based on the data subject's consent. 150 The vast scale of data processing for behavioural targeting aggravates the chilling effects, and the lack of individual control over personal information. And large-scale data storage brings risks, such as data breaches.
Compliance with the data minimisation principle could mitigate such privacy problems. Policymakers should explicitly codify that the data subject's consent does not legitimise disproportionate data processing. Such a rule could remind firms that consent does not give them carte blanche to collect personal information at will, and that a DPA could intervene if they did.
Perhaps the law could prohibit storing data for behavioural targeting longer than a set period of, to give an example, two days. Such a hard and fast rule would provide more legal certainty than the general data minimisation principle. Compared to estimating when the data minimisation principle requires deletion, complying with a maximum retention period of two days is easy for firms. As an aside, it is unclear whether storing tracking data for longer than a few days helps much to improve the clickthrough rate on ads. principle as a means to empower the individual, the principle could also be seen as more prohibitive. With some behavioural targeting practices, it would be hard for a website publisher to comply with data protection law's transparency requirements, even if it tried its best. For example, some ad networks allow other ad networks to buy access to individuals (identified through cookies or other identifiers) by bidding on an automated auction. 152 In such situations, the website publisher does not know in advance which ad networks will display ads on its site, and which ad networks will track its website visitors. In data protection parlance: the publisher does not know who the joint data controllers are. 153 Neither does the publisher know for which purposes the ad networks will use the data they collect. As noted, the Directive obliges data controllers to provide a data subject information about their identity, the processing purpose, and all other information that is necessary to guarantee fair processing. 154 Therefore, it is hard to see how the publisher could comply with the law's transparency requirements. If a publisher cannot give data subjects the information that is required by the Data Protection Directive, the processing is not allowed -and should not be allowed. Policymakers should make more explicit that processing is prohibited, unless firms can comply with the transparency principle.
Data protection law has a stricter regime for 'special categories of data', such as data revealing race, political opinions, health, or sex life. The use of special categories of data for behavioural targeting and other types of direct marketing is prohibited, or, depending on the national implementation law, only allowed after the data subject's 'explicit' consent. 155 Strictly enforcing the existing rules on special categories of data could reduce privacy problems such as chilling effects. Let us take health data as an example. People might be hesitant to look for medical information on the web if they fear leaking information about their medical condition. The rules on special categories of data could be interpreted in such a way that the collection context is taken into account. For instance, arguably tracking people's visits to websites with medical information should be seen as the processing of special categories of data, as firms could infer data regarding health from such tracking information. 156 Furthermore, policymakers should consider banning the use of any health related data for behavioural targeting. The privacy risks involved in using health data for behavioural targeting seem to outweigh the possible societal benefits from such practices.
The law could also prohibit take-it-or-leave-it choices in some circumstances or contexts. 157 For instance, public service broadcasters often receive public funding, and they have a special role in informing people. But if people fear their behaviour is being monitored, they might forego the use of public service media. 158 To reduce such chilling effects, policymakers should prohibit public service broadcasters to use tracking walls or similar take-it-or-leave-it choices. Policymakers could also go one step further, and prohibit all third party tracking for behavioural targeting on public service media. More generally it is questionable whether it is appropriate for public sector websites to allow third party tracking for behavioural targeting -even when people consent. It is not evident why the public sector should facilitate tracking people's behaviour for commercial purposes. Therefore, policymakers should consider prohibiting all tracking for behavioural targeting on public sector websites.
Using transaction costs strategically
Policymakers could also use an intermediate option between default rules that aim to empower people and mandatory protective rules. Policymakers could use transaction costs strategically. 159 As noted, marketers understand the importance of transaction costs -and sometimes use them strategically. Opting out of behavioural targeting often takes more effort than opting in. On the website Youronlinechoices, managed by the Interactive Advertising Bureau, it takes three clicks and a waiting period to opt out of receiving behaviourally targeted ads. 160 In principle, policymakers could do something similar.
For example, policymakers could strengthen a nudge that consists of setting a default by adding transaction costs, thereby making the default stickier. 161 Perhaps one mouse click could be required to give consent to relatively innocuous kinds of tracking.
Three mouse clicks could be required for more worrying practices. 'Sticky defaults', But caution is needed if policymakers consider adding friction to consent procedures in the area of behavioural targeting. A legal regime that adds transaction costs and allows firms to offer take-it-or-leave-it choices could lead to an unpleasant situation.
Website publishers could use tracking walls, also if policymakers required three mouse clicks for consent. People would not enjoy clicking three times 'I agree' if they want to visit a website, and accept they have to agree to tracking. With that caveat, the conclusion still stands: the distinction between mandatory rules and opt-in systems (default rules) is not a black and white issue. In principle policymakers have a range of options.
In conclusion, enforcing and tightening the data protection principles could help to protect privacy in the area of behavioural targeting. An important topic that falls 160 In a non-scientific test, I had to wait forty-five seconds. First I had to choose a country (click 1), then I had to click on "your ad choices" (click 2). Next I had to wait until the website contacted the participating ad networks. Then I could opt out of receiving targeted advertising (click 3). For several ad networks the website gave an error message (Youronlinechoices <http://www.youronlinechoices.com/ma/faqs#21> accessed 30 June 2014). 161 If a nudge is made stronger by using transaction costs strategically, it might not count as a 'nudge' anymore, since it is not 'easy and cheap to avoid' (Sunstein CR 
Conclusion
To protect privacy in the area of behavioural targeting the European Union mainly relies on the consent requirement for the use of tracking technologies in the e-Privacy
Directive, and on general data protection law. With informed consent requirements, the law aims to empower people to make choices in their best interests. But behavioural studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of such an approach.
There is no silver bullet to improve privacy protection in this area. While current regulation emphasises empowerment and informed consent, without much reflection on practical issues, I argue for a combined approach of protecting and empowering people. To improve individual empowerment, the data protection rules should be tightened, and should be enforced more strictly. For example, long unreadable privacy policies should not be accepted. Aiming for empowerment will not suffice to protect privacy. Nevertheless, some improvement must be possible, as today personal data are generally captured and used without meaningful transparency or consent.
Policymakers could also try to nudge Internet users towards disclosing less data. For instance, policymakers could require firms to obtain the individual's opt-in consent for tracking. The discussion about privacy defaults has been going on for the past 25 years in Europe. Marketers have argued that they should be allowed to use opt-out systems to obtain 'implied' consent for direct marketing, and, more recently, for tracking cookies. In line with legal doctrine, European Data Protection Authorities say consent requires an expression of will, which generally calls for opt-in procedures.
The debate essentially concerns the direction of a nudge: who benefits from the status quo bias, the firm or the data subject? However, such privacy nudges run into problems. As long as the law allows firms to offer-take-it-or-leave-it choices, firms can easily persuade people to agree to tracking.
I argue that policymakers should focus more on protecting people. After all, the 
